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In the present contribution we show how the optimal amount of economic capi-
tal can be derived such that it minimizes the economic cost of risk-bearing. The 
economic cost of risk-bearing takes into account the cost of the economic capi-
tal as well as the cost of the residual risk. In addition to the absolute problem 
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the problem of economic capital allocation themselves. Clearly, in an equilibrium 
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allocation derived by the subsidiaries coincide.  We show that the diversifica-
tion benefit which is typically obtained in a conglomerate construction, creates 
a  virtual economic capital for  subsidiaries within the conglomerate. We show 
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1 1  Introduction: the evolution of beliefs 
In many countries an important technique for  the financing of life  insurances,  in 
particular legal pensions, has been the so-called repartition system, in which the 
"belief"  in the labor force  of the next generation  "guarantees"  the benefits to be 
paid out. Another "belief"  arose when actuaries started to create solvency buffers 
and to set up reserves, which are financed out of the premiums, in order to be able to 
pay the benefits in future years, leading to management by economic capital. In that 
case the "belief" in management activity of the future generations is the "guarantee" . 
A third "belief" was created when investors could convince risk bearers that risk can 
be hedged within financial markets. Here the "guarantee"  is  based on the "belief" 
that in the financial markets one always finds the possibility to place the risk at a 
predetermined price. These three types of beliefs governing repartition, funding and 
financial market transfers all contain their own exposure to a default of the approach. 
For repartition it is  clear that longevity is a threat, for funding inflation and other 
economic factors constitute a  threat and in financial markets a  breakdown of the 
system because of e.g.  como  no  tonic effects is a threat, as was indicated recently by 
Warren Buffett. 
Hence,  due to the differences  in underlying threats, the existence of a  perfect 
hedge between financing structures in financial markets and insurance markets seems 
to be a fiction. A particular financing structure is based on a belief that can be for-
mulated as a set of axioms, concerning the behavior of rational human beings (see 
Markovitz (1952,  1959)). We completely agree with the Markovitz concept and the 
basic principles that are underlying it:  "We might decide that in one context one 
basic set of principles is  appropriate,  while  in another context  a  different  set  of 
principles should be used. We might find that some patterns of preferences are con-
sistent with a  set of preferences while other patterns are not (Markovitz (1959))." 
Following his flow of ideas, we think that preference axioms constitute flexible defi-
nitions to determine or estimate the cost of decisions made in a particular context. 
This cost depends on an estimate of the risks by means of an axiomatically founded 
risk measure expressed in financial terms. These types of risk measures have been 
studied extensively in actuarial science  (see e.g.  Biihlmann (1970),  Gerber (1979) 
and Goovaerts, De Vylder and Haezendonck (1984)), where they are known as "pre-
mium principles" , once called  "insurance principles"  by Markovitz. Variables such 
as solvency margin, economic capital, capital allocation and asset mix should then 
be derived in an optimization procedure, e.g.  by minimizing economic cost or by 
maximizing profits, given the preference patterns in the particular context. 
Indeed, there exists a fundamental difference between financial markets and in-
surance markets. In standardized financial markets the law-of-one-price enforces that 
each risk can be placed in the market at a  unique price. This is  however certainly 
not the case in insurance markets, in which generally no unique price exists. The fair 
value of an insurance portfolio, which is the value of the portfolio induced by market 
parameters, might be different from the valuation by a particular insurer. Arbitrage 
opportunities in the illiquid and non-standardized insurance markets are difficult to 
determine and even more difficult to exploit. Indeed the seller and the buyer may 
well have a  different perception of the price of the portfolio. This is then typically 
2 due to a different approach to determine the amount of reserves needed. In the case 
of Value-at-Risk (VaR) e.g., the seller might use a percentile of order 90% while the 
buyer uses a percentile of order 95%. One can buy a particular type of car everywhere 
at almost the same price, but an insurance portfolio is a unique product that can be 
valued differently according to a management criterion, the degree of risk aversion 
being the differentiating factor.  Different degrees of risk aversion lead to different 
amounts of economic capital, obtained as a  tradeoff between the preferred level of 
risk exposure and the economic cost of capital. We encounter a  similar problem in 
statistics where there is no unique level to be used in the testing of hypothesis. The 
reason for this is that hypothesis testing is not a one dimensional problem (with one 
criterion) but it is a  problem where there are two possible errors to be considered: 
the so-called type I error where one accepts the wrong hypothesis and the type II 
error where one does not accept the true hypothesis. Indeed, the same type of prob-
lem arises in problems of capital allocation and solvency measurement. It is easy to 
derive a  solvency margin that guarantees non-ruin. Clearly,  it is sufficient to have 
an infinite solvency margin. However, the cost of this solvency margin is  generally 
infinite. Hence, the optimal solvency margin is obtained as a  compromise between 
the economic cost of capital on the one hand and the preferred safety level on the 
other hand. 
For the allocation of economic capital one has to consider two different problems. 
First, one needs to determine how  large a  solvency margin should be for  a  given 
conglomerate. This is  the absolute problem of the determination of the economic 
capital. The second problem concerns how one should allocate a  given amount of 
economic capital (eventually the optimal one in absolute terms) among the different 
subsidiaries. This is the relative problem of economic capital allocation. Since sub-
sidiaries are legal entities, they will also consider the absolute problem of economic 
capital allocation themselves. An equilibrium situation exists within the conglomer-
ate in case the relative allocation of economic capital derived by the conglomerate 
and the absolute allocation derived by the subsidiaries coincide. The widely observed 
preference for  a  conglomerate construction can be explained by the existence of a 
virtual economic capital for  subsidiaries within the conglomerate. 
In the present contribution we  consider the management of economic  capital 
within financial conglomerates.  In particular, we  address allocation and diversifi-
cation issues  and demonstrate the emergence of virtual economic capital within 
conglomerates.  Furthermore, we  discuss the role of economic capital in problems 
of optimal portfolio selection. We refer to Goovaerts, Dhaene and Kaas (2003)  for 
previous related results. The outline of the paper is as follows:  in section 2 we derive 
solutions to both the absolute and the relative problem of economic capital allo-
cation. In section 3 we compare subsidiaries when incorporated in a  conglomerate 
construction with subsidiaries when considered as stand alone entities and introduce 
the notion of virtual economic capital. Section 4 demonstrates that the absolute al-
location approach can also be applied to the problem of optimal portfolio selection, 
taking into account the available amount of surplus capital and thus extending the 
well-known Markovitz approach. 
3 2  Capital allocation and solvency measurement 
A  risk is represented by a  random variable X, which is  defined on a  set of states 
of nature n and is to be interpreted as the future net loss or deficit of a  portfolio 
or position currently held. For simplicity we henceforth restrict to random variables 
with absolutely continuous and strictly increasing distribution functions,  although 
the results can be generalized to allow for random variables with discontinuous and 
non-decreasing distribution functions. 
We will first illustrate that from a mathematical point of view the relative prob-
lem of optimal allocation of economic capital is equivalent to the relative problem of 
imposing solvency margins by a regulatory authority. For the former problem, con-
sider a  financial conglomerate, in particular think of an insurance company, which 
consists of n  subsidiaries.  For the latter problem consider a  particular insurance 
market,  consisting of n  conglomerates supervised by a  regulator.  Indeed,  letting 
Xj denote the risk of subsidiary j, respectively the risk of conglomerate j, U  the 
economic capital, respectively the aggregated solvency capital in  the market, the 
following figures illustrate the same problem: 
Figure 1: Capital allocation among subsidiaries 
Subsidiary 1:  Xl  Subsidiary 2:  X 2  Subsidiary n:  Xn  Conglomerate: Xl + ... + Xn 
u 
The relative capital allocation problem is concerned with the question how the eco-
nomic capital U is to be distributed among the subsidiaries, attaching Uj to subsidiary 
j  in an optimal way.  Clearly, the absolute amount of economic capital U  strongly 
depends on the price of economic capital and the risk aversion of the conglomerate. 
Figure 2:  Solvency measurement by a regulatory authority 
Conglomerate 1: Xl  Conglomerate 2:  X2  Conglomerate n: Xn  lvlarket supervised: Xl + ... + Xn 
u 
The relative problem of solvency measurement from a  regulatory point of view, is 
concerned with the question how to attribute to the conglomerates the aggregated 
solvency capital u, which is available in the market, attaching Uj to conglomerate 
j  in an optimal way.  The value of U  in  absolute terms highly depends on the risk 
perception of the conglomerates and the judgement of the regulator. 
We remark that both relative problems are important from  performance and 
risk evaluation perspectives. By determining Uj for j  =  1, ... ,n, the conglomerate 
4 may evaluate the economic cost of risk-bearing and the risk-adjusted return per sub-
sidiary and may allocate costs among subsidiaries correspondingly. The supervisory 
authority may rank companies on the basis of the ratio of Uj and their actually held 
solvency margin. 
There are other problems in insurance which have the same structure. Indeed 
consider a  top-down approach for rating purposes. Suppose one has to fix  the to-
tal premium income required for  a  particular insurance portfolio (e.g.  determined 
by market and competition conditions or on statistical grounds). Then the relative 
problem consists in the distribution of the total premium income over all contracts. 
Another example is  the problem of the determination of optimal reinsurance con-
tracts, where e.g.  in proportional reinsurance the relative problem consists in the 
determination of the different proportionality levels for the different contracts and 
then match the results with the aggregated required level based on stability criteria 
(e.g. by using a ruin probability risk measure as in Biihlmann (1970)). 
In this section, we will consider both the absolute and the relative problem of 
economic capital allocation. We demonstrate that there will generally exist optimal 
values (u*, uis , ...  ,u~S) which solve the absolute economic capital problem for  the 
conglomerate, respectively for the subsidiaries when considered as stand alone enti-
ties. The relative problem consists in the distribution of u*  among the subsidiaries 
allocating uj to subsidiary j, under the constraint that u*  =  ui + ... +  u~. The 
solutions (uis , .. .  ,u~S) and (ui, ...  ,u~) generally differ. 
2.1  The relative problem of economic capital allocation 
For  the  relative  problem  of economic  capital  allocation,  we  distinguish  two  ap-
proaches. The first  "pragmatic" one consists in defining a risk measure p(X), which 
distributes the capital u* in a proportional way: 
u*  u~  ui + ... +  u~ 
p(Xn)  p(XI ) + ... + p(Xn) 
(1) 
One can translate the allocation principle p(.)  establishing the distribution of eco-
nomic capital by means of a set of axioms. Indeed, if full allocation of the economic 
capital is required, i.e.  ui + ... +  u~ =  u*, then the axiom of additivity of the risk 
measure is the axiomatic translation of the above proportional allocation. 
The second approach, which is the better one in our opinion, consists in consid-
ering the residual risk of each of the subsidiaries. In this approach one has to relate 
the residual risk of the conglomerate, given by 
max  (Xl + ... + Xn - u*, 0)  =  (Xl + ... + Xn - u*)+  (2) 
to the residual risk of the subsidiaries seen as separated juridical entities, given by 
As long as u*  2:  UI + ... +  Un the diversification effect, being the situation that the 
conglomerate has a  residual risk that is  smaller than the one of the subsidiaries, 
follows because of the following stochastic dominance relation: 
5 Hence, any risk measure that preserves stochastic dominance is consistent with the 
diversification effect. The advantage of considering the residual risk is that we have 
the opportunity to "optimize" the capital allocation rather than using a proportion-
ality rule which is  not based on any economic motivation. When management is 
facing the problem of allocating the amount u*  among the subsidiaries, it is  natu-
ral to require u* = ui + ... +  u~. Consequently the application of the proportional 
approach would immediately lead to the necessity of having an additive risk measure 
(5) 
However, imposing additivity of the risk measure p(.)  for  all forms of dependence 
structure between the subsidiaries, characterizes an expectation principle under very 
general conditions (see e.g.  Goovaerts, De Vylder and Haezendonck (1984)). 
Using the second approach, a  "better" distribution of the capital u  is  possible 
so as to minimize the residual risk of the subsidiaries. To illustrate the approach, 
let's take as an example the expectation to measure the residual risk (beware of the 
distinction between the allocation principle pC), which in fact equals the allocation, 
and the measure for the risk residual, which is  used to establish the allocation). It 
is  obvious that the expectation is  a  stochastic dominance preserving risk measure 
and therefore preserves the so-called  diversification  effects.  Then the  risk of the 
subsidiaries as measured by the conglomerate is given by 
(6) 
We then solve the problem 
(7) 
which  mInImIZeS  the risk  measure  (here  the expectation)  applied to the sum of 
the risk residuals representing the subsidiaries after the capital allocation has been 
performed. Solving this problem by means of Lagrange multipliers gives 
j  = 1, ... ,n  (8) 
where s  is  determined as FXj'+.  .. +Xii (u*)  =  1 - s, in which FXf+  ... +Xii  denotes the 
distribution function of the comonotonic random vector (Xl' ... ' Xj;)  with same 
marginal distribution functions as (Xl, ... ,Xn). The interested reader is referred to 
Dhaene et al.  (2002a, 2002b) for an elaborate treatment of the concept of comono-
tonicity. Hence, uj = FXjl (FXf+  ... +Xii (u*)). The expectation of the residual risk of 
the conglomerate is  bounded from  above by the expectation of the sum over the 
residual risks of the subsidiaries: 
6 Furthermore, we have that 
lE [(Xl + " .  + Xn - U*)+ J =:; t lE [(  Xj - F.Xjl (FXf+···+Xg (U*))) +J 
J=l 
lE[(Xf + ... +  X~  - U*)+J  (10) 
Hence, the diversification benefit (DB) of incorporating subsidiaries in a conglom-
erate is  given by 
Note that the diversification benefit stems from the diversification effect on the resid-
ual risk level of the conglomerate (see also in this context the report of the Casualty 
Actuarial Society (1999)). For the expectation risk measure, the diversification ben-
efit is  non-negative.  Consequently, one might consider a  diversification gain to be 
flowing back to the subsidiaries. A natural choice for the allocation of the diversifi-
cation benefit would be to distribute it proportionally to the expected residual risk 
of each of the subsidiaries, i.e. 
j=1, ... ,n  (12) 
2.2  The absolute problem of economic capital allocation 
In order to illustrate the absolute problem of economic capital allocation, we  con-
sider the situation in which the aggregated future losses of the conglomerate is given 
by Y and analogously Yj  for the subsidiaries, and the premium income amounts to P 
and Pj  respectively. We naturally assume that Y  =  2:7=1 Yj  and P  =  2:7=1 Pj  and 
denote the difference between the future losses and the corresponding premium in-
come by X and Xj respectively. Furthermore, we denote by (i - r) the economic cost 
of raising capital. We consider a risk measure that preserves stochastic dominance, 
i.e. 
X  =:;1  Y  '*  p(X) =:;  p(Y)  (13) 
We take as possible examples 
Pl(X,U) = lE[(X - u)+J + (i - r)u  (14) 
and (see Kaas et al.  (2001)) 
u  (  ilog(c) I  )  . 
P2(X, u) = I  log(c) I  log  lE[ exp(  u  X)J  + (z - r)u,  cE(0,1]  (15) 
for both of which one can easily prove that if X = Xl + X2  and u = Ul +  U2  then 
(16) 
7 which expresses the diversification effect on the residual risk level. In order to further 
simplify expression  (15)  we  consider the economic capitals to be relatively large. 
Then 
P2(X, u)  ~  P3(X, u)  =  JE[X] + Ilo~~E)1 Var[X] + (i - r)u.  (17) 
using only two terms of the Taylor expansion. Suppose that JE[X] + JE[Y]  :::;  Ilo~(€)I. 
Then one can easily verify that P3(X, u)  :::;  P3(Y, u)  in case X  :::;1  Y. However, note 
that in contrast to P2(X, u)  the approximation P3(X, u)  does no longer satisfy the 
subadditivity property. 
To solve the absolute economic capital allocation problem we minimize the risk 
measure p(X, u) with respect to u. For the choice of PI (X, u) = JE [(X -u)+] +  (i-r)u 
we obtain the following solutions: 
j  =  1, ... ,n 
(18) 
(19) 
Hence, the optimal amount of economic capital can be calculated by the VaR mea-
sure of which the percentile level depends on the economic cost of capital. Now we 
compare (19)  with  (8).  We find  that in order to enforce that the solution to the 
absolute problem of economic capital allocation for the subsidiaries corresponds to 
the preference value of the conglomerate, which is  the solution to the relative allo-
cation problem, the conglomerate can simply charge a  shadow cost of capital  A to 
its subsidiaries. Then, the solution to the absolute allocation problem for subsidiary 
j  is  given 
U?(A) = FXjl(1 - (i - r) - A),  j  = 1, ... ,n  (20) 
where A is to be determined as 
n 
Fx 1 (1 - (i - r)) = L FXjl (1 - (i - r) - A)  (21) 
j=l 
or equivalently 
A =  1 - (i - r) - FXf+  ... +X,'; (FX;+  ... +Xn (1- (i - r)))  (22) 
Hence, indeed the absolute solution U?(A), corresponding to a cost of economic cap-
ital (i - r) +  A, equals the relative allocation uj. It is not difficult to see that typically 
(not always, see Kaas and Tang (2003) for some interesting counterexamples) A :::::  0 
and hence U?(A)  :::;  ujs.  Thus, both the conglomerate and the subsidiaries incor-
porated in the conglomerate can use the VaR measure to determine their economic 
capital, which is  highly attractive from a  corporate governance point of view.  We 
remark that VaR allocation is  consistent with the capital adequacy requirements 
established by the Basle Capital Accord (see Basle Committee (1988,  1996,2003)), 
under which banks currently operate. Subadditivity of the allocation does not play 
a  role in this capital allocation approach. The fact that the order of the percentile 
is  not the same in both (18)  and (20)  is  rather natural.  How can one compare a 
percentile level for the conglomerate with a percentile level for the subsidiaries? 
8 Next, for the risk measure P3(X,U)  =  lE[X] + Ilo~~c:)IVar[X] + (i - r)u we obtain 
u*S  = 
J 
u;S(>-)  = 
In this situation, because 
u* =  I log(c) I  Var[X]' 
2(i - r) 
Ilog(c)1 V  [X.] 
2(i-r)  ar  J,  j  = 1, .. . ,n 
I log(c) I 
2(i - r + >-) Var[Xj]'  j  = 1, ... ,n 
I log(c) I  Var[X] < :t 
2(i - r)  - . 
I  log(c) I  V  [X.] 





it holds true that >- ~ 0 if it is determined such that "Ej=l u;S(>-) = u*,  and hence 
a shadow cost is due. 
Another interpretation is possible by transforming 10  into 10', representing a larger 
probability of ruin: 
I  log(c) I  I  log(c') I  ,  --,-'----'--'-'--,- =  =?  10  < 10 
2(i-r+>-)  2(i-r)  -
(27) 
This finding is  also natural since within a conglomerate one can intuitively accept a 
probability of ruin at the subsidiary level that is higher than the probability of ruin 
at the conglomerate level,  which brings out the diversification benefit in another 
way. 
The values of u;S(>-) can be obtained by solving the following system of equations 
numerically: 
u;S(>-)  JVar[Xj] 
u*  "Ej=l JVar[Xj]' 
j  =  1, ... ,n  (28) 
3  The emergence of virtual economic capital 
Since subsidiaries are juridical entities, one should indeed not only solve the absolute 
problem of economic capital allocation for  the conglomerate, but also for the sub-
sidiaries, when considered as stand alone entities. The latter solutions should then 
be compared with the solutions to the relative allocation problem of the conglom-
erate. Using PI (X, u) defined in (14)  as the risk measure in the absolute allocation 
problem, we derived in section 2.2 that 
(29) 
which is to be compared with 
9 using the expectation in the relative allocation problem (7).  Clearly, instead of uj 
we  can also write U?(A)  as defined in  (20),  corresponding to a  capital cost  (i  -
r) + A.  We have seen in section 2.2 that in general (not always) uj(A)  ::;  u? and 
hence A ~  O.  In case A < 0,  the conglomerate will typically regard its existence as 
undesirable. Obviously, a subsidiary is willing to pay a positive shadow cost A only if 
it is compensated by the conglomerate in some sense. Hence, we should consider the 
diversification benefit for the subsidiaries of being incorporated in the conglomerate. 
The cost of risk-bearing of subsidiary j  when considered as a stand alone entity 
is given by 
j  =  1, ... ,n  (31) 
Furthermore, the cost of risk-bearing attributed to subsidiary j  when incorporated 
in the conglomerate construction, but without taking into account the diversification 
benefit is  given by 
j  = 1, ... ,n  (32) 
The conglomerate situation becomes more favorable in case the diversification ben-
efits are taken into account. We have seen in (11) that the diversification benefit of 
the conglomerate construction is  given by 
n 
DB = LlE[(Xj -U?(A))+] -lE[(X -u)+] 
j=l 
n 
(1 - a) LlE[  (Xj - U;S(A))+],  for some a  E  [0,1] 
j=l 
Taking into account the diversification benefits, according to a  proportional distri-
bution among the subsidiaries, the cost of risk-bearing attributed to subsidiary j  is 
given by 
cjDB(A) =(i - r + A)U?(A) + alE [(Xj  - U?(A))+]  = 
(i - r + A)U;S(A) +  lE[ (Xj - ujDB(A))+],  j  =  1, ... ,n  (33) 
Clearly, cjDB(A)  ::;  C?(A)  and ujDB(A)  ~ U;S(A).  The difference between ujDB(A) 
and U?(A)  is what we call the virtual economic  capital  of subsidiary j, i.e. 
U;V(A)  =  ujDB(A) - U;S(A)  ~  0,  j  =  1, ... ,n  (34) 
The existence of the diversification benefit and hence of a  virtual economic capi-
tal should not be ignored by the regulatory authority when assessing the solvency 
position of each subsidiary. 
To determine whether or not the conglomerate construction is  beneficial when 
compared with the stand alone situation, one should consider the difference 
cjDB(A) - c? = 
(i - r + A)U;S(A) +  lE [(Xj  - ujDB(A))+] - (i - r)u;S -lE[(Xj - ujB)+] 
which for  subsidiary j  mayor may not be non-positive, depending on the relative 
dependence structure within the conglomerate and the cost of economic capital. 
10 3.1  Generalization with a  comonotonic additive risk measure 
We will now generalize the previous results by replacing PI (X, u)  by a comonotonic 
additive risk measure. In particular, we specify 
P4(X, u) = 1f( (X - uh) + (i - r)u = 101 
F(JLu)+ (y)d(l - g(l - y)) + (i - r)u = 
1
00 g(l - Fx(x))dx + (i - r)u  (35) 
for  some strictly increasing and continuous function  9  :  [0,1]  ---7  [0,1],  satisfying 
g(O)  = °  and g(l) =  l. The function g(.)  is  known as  a  distortion  or probability 
weighting  function. We refer to Yaari (1987)  and Wang, Young and Panjer (1997) 
for  an axiomatic characterization of distortion risk measures. It is  not difficult to 
verify that if u =  U1 + ... +  Un  then 
(36) 
and hence P4(X, u)  is  a  comonotonic additive risk measure.  Minimizing P4(X, u) 
with respect to u  yields the following solutions: 
*S-F-1(1  -1(.  ))  Uj  - Xj  - 9  z - r  , 
U;S(A)  = FXj1(1- g-l(i - r + A)), 
where A is  determined such that 
n 
j  = 1, ... ,n 
j  = 1, ... ,n 






As before, A typically satisfies A ~ 0.  We remark that U;S(A)  as defined in (39)  is 
not in general equal to the relative allocation uj obtained by solving 
Clearly, one may introduce a vector (AI, ... , An)  to establish the equality U;S(Aj)  = 
uj,  j  =  1, ... , n.  However, for  reasons of simplicity we  restrict to a  single shadow 
cost  A.  The diversification benefit of incorporating subsidiaries in a  conglomerate 
construction is then given by 
n 
DB = L 1f( (Xj - U;S(A))+)  -1f((X1 + ... + Xn - u*)+) = 
j=l 
1f((Xf + ... + X~  - u*)+) -1f((X1 + ... + Xn - u*)+)  (41) 
It can be verified that for a concave distortion function g(.), the diversification benefit 
is  non-negative in general.  Clearly, if a  negative diversification benefit occurs, the 
11 subsidiaries will typically not be willing  to pay a  positive  shadow cost  .\ and a 
conglomerate construction will appear to be undesirable. In case of a non-negative 
diversification benefit, we have that 
DB = (1  - a)7T((Xf + ... + X~  - u*h),  for some a  E  [0,1]  (42) 
which may be distributed among the subsidiaries. Hence, the cost of risk-bearing 
attributed to subsidiary j, taking into account the shadow cost .\ and the diversifi-
cation benefit according to a proportional distribution, is given by 
cjDB(.\) =(i - r + .\)u;S(.\) + a7T( (Xj - u;S(.\))+)  = 
(i - r + .\)u;S(.\) + 7T( (Xj - ujDB(.\))+),  j  =  1, ... ,n 
Again a virtual economic capital u?(.\) = ujDB(.\) - u;S(.\)  emerges. 
(43) 
4  The role of economic capital in optimal portfolio se-
lection 
In practice, people working in the framework of optimal portfolio selection generally 
agree  that  in order to benefit  from  supplementary returns some  surplus capital 
(call it economic capital) is desirable. Optimal portfolio selection is often performed 
on the basis of the well-known Markovitz portfolio selection approach (Markovitz 
(1952,  1959)). An alternative procedure, employing a shortfall constraint has been 
developed in Basak and Shapiro (2001). In the present investigation, we  present an 
approach that explicitly takes into account the amount of economic capital available 
and the economic cost of raising it. 
We denote by V  the future random gain obtained by an investment eo  in risk-
free  assets generating a  non-random return r,  and investments e j  in  risky assets 
], j  = 1, ... , m  with random return Xj, i.e. 
(44) 
Furthermore,  we  let e =  eo  + ... + em  denote  the total amount  invested.  The 
Markovitz portfolio theory considers a utility function 
U = V - /'(V _lE[V])2  (45) 
where /,  denotes a tolerance level, i.e.  a degree of risk aversion. The optimal invest-
ment portfolio is then obtained by maximizing 
(46) 
Since the dimension of lE[V]  is  the monetary unit and the dimension of  lE [(V -
lE [V]) 2]  is  the  "squared monetary unit", it is  reasonable to think of /,  as  a  toler-
ance level expressed in "1  over monetary units" . This natural interpretation is often 
12 overlooked, typically leading to unrealistic results (see e.g. Gerrard, Haberman and 
Vigna (2003)  and Schnieper (2003)).  One could choose e.g.  /.,  = a/u where a  is  a 
dimensionless constant and u  denotes the amount of economic capital available. 
An alternative approach following Markovitz general concept could be to consider 
the expected gain lE [ max(V - er, 0)]  =  lE [(V - er) +]  on the risky portfolio and 
deduct from it the cost of the downside risk JJlE [ max(  er - V, 0)]  = JJlE [  (er - V)+ J, 
in which JJ  >  1 due to the safety margin which is required in the actuarial framework. 
Hence, we introduce the following utility function: 
U =  (V - er)+ - JJ(er - V)+,  JJ>l  (47) 
Then, 
JJ>l  (48) 
represents  the  expected  utility  of the  investment  strategy  (eo, e 1, ...  , em)  which 
should be maximized. However, the available economic capital does not playa role 
in this approach, which is against common sense. To capture the effect of economic 
capital in the selection procedure, we  employ a  specific  pricing principle  (or  risk 
measure) for the downside risk, in particular we use a pricing principle expressed in 
terms of the economic capital, namely 
u  ([  (I log(c) 1  )])  Ilog(c)l log  lE  exp  u  (er - V)+  ,  c E  (0,1]  (49) 
based on a ruin criterion (see e.g. Kaas et al.  (2001)). Introducing this pricing prin-
ciple into the expected utility expression yields 
lE[U]  = lE[(V - er)+] - 1  IO;(c) 1  log (lE [exp C  lo~(c)1 (er - Vh)])  (50) 
Suppose that u  is relatively large. Then the above expression can be approximated 
by 
using only the first two terms of the Taylor expansion. When maximizing the ex-
pected utility of the investment strategy, we naturally restrict to solutions (eo, ei, ... ,  e:n,) 
for which the value ofthe objective function (51)  is non-negative. It follows that the 
economic capital u should be large enough in order to construct an optimal portfolio. 
For the case of only 1 risky asset, the optimal portfolio with total amount invested 
equal to e =  eo + e 1  is given by 
(52) 
Observe that the amount invested in the risky asset is  naturally increasing in the 
amount of economic capital. We remark that the expected utility in expression (51) 
13 does not take into account the economic cost of capital (i - r )u. Clearly, for a given 
level of economic capital the solution (eo, ei, ... ,e:n)  is  independent of whether or 
not the economic cost of capital is  taken into account. Indeed, adding a  constant 
-(i - r)u to the objective function (51)  does not affect the solution. However,  let 
us now consider the case of a  variable level of economic capital. In that case the 
expected utility maximization problem is  given by 
max  m  lE[V]-er_llog(c)IVar[(er-V)+] -(i-r)u  (53) 
(80,fh ,  ... ,8m ),ul 2:: j =o 8j =8  2u 




ei =  61  - eo  =  ae,  a  E [0,1]' 
0, 
lE[X1]- r  - j2Ilog(c)l(i - r)Var[(r - X 1)+]  > 0 
lE[X1]- r  - j2Ilog(c)l(i - r)Var[(r - Xd+] = 0 
lE[X1]- r  - j2Ilog(c)l(i - r)Var[(r - X 1)+]  < 0 
(54) 
not allowing short-selling and hence restricting to e j  ::::::  0, j  =  1,2. Furthermore, the 
optimal amount of surplus capital is given by 
U* = ll*l  I log(c) I Var[(r - X)  ] 
o  2(i _  r)  1  +  (55) 
Hence, we find that in case of only one risky asset, the optimal investment strategy 
is  a  boundary solution. Indeed, if the risk premium lE[X1] - r  is  sufficiently large, 
the total amount 61  should be invested in the risky asset. Otherwise, it is optimal to 
invest only in the risk-free asset and to hold no surplus capital. Whether or not the 
risk premium is sufficiently large, naturally depends on the economic cost of capital. 
5  Conclusions 
We proposed a solution to both the absolute and the relative problem of economic 
capital allocation based on a  residual risk consideration.  The solutions take into 
account the economic cost of capital. We compared the relative allocation among 
subsidiaries with the absolute allocation for  subsidiaries when considered as stand 
alone entities. We demonstrated the existence of a virtual economic capital for sub-
sidiaries  in a  conglomerate,  which should be recognized  as  such by a  regulatory 
authority. The positive value difference between the solvency margin as imposed for 
rating considerations (e.g.  a  99.975%  level)  and the optimal amount of economic 
capital as obtained in this paper, may be used to generate supplementary returns. 
Hence, we considered the role of economic capital in optimal portfolio selection. We 
found that for  a  variable level of economic capital and the case of only one risky 
asset a boundary solution is obtained: it is optimal to invest either in the risky asset 
or in the risk-free asset. 
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